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STATE OF UTAH 
CLARENCE P. MARTIN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
RALPH L. JONES dba MOUNTAIR 
PHARMACY, 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case No. 7766 
ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Respondent in his Petition for Rehearing has sep,. 
arated his argument into two phases (1) the owner'~ 
liability to a trespasser; (2) contributory negligence. 
( 1) The owner's liability to a trespasser 
Respondent states at page 2 of its Petition for 
Rehearing: 
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2 
"In his opinion Justice Wolfe assumes that the 
plaintiff was a trespasser and he departs from 
the rule established by the decisions of the courts to 
follow the academic statement in the 'Restatement 
of the Law of Torts,' which, we submit, if given 
practical application virtually makes the possessor 
of real property an insurer of the safety of all 
persons who, having no right to go upon his prop-
erty, are injured by some conditition which, though 
it may be dangerous to such trespasser, the owner 
desires for his own convenience to maintain . . . " 
Respondent's conclusion that the rule as given in the 
Restatement is merely academic and has no practical ap .. 
plication is erroneous. The courts have sustained gener-
ally the proposition as set forth in the Restatement. It is 
submitted that there will not be found in the cases a 
direct quotation as found in the Restatement. However, 
this same result is reached by the courts under various 
doctrines such as pitfalls, traps, nuisances, or that in a 
situation similar to the case at bar failure to warn 
amounts to wilful, wanton or reckless conduct. 
In 38 American Jurisprudence Par. 113, NEGLI-
EGENCE, it is stated: 
"Warning Trespasser of Danger. Generally 
speaking, an owner or occupant of real property is 
under no duty to a trespasser in respect of the con-
dition of the premises. Some courts have gone quite 
far in the protection afforded to trespassers, holding 
that when the owner or occupant knows of their pres-
ence upon his premises and their probable ignor-
ance of perils thereon he is bound to give them no-
tice of the danger. But it would seem that the 
dangerous instrumentality, in such case, must be 
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such as to constitute a nuisance; or the situation 
must be such that the failure to give a warning 
amounts to wilful, wanton or reckless conduct, 
or to a breach of the duty of ordinary care which is 
owed by an owner or occupant to a trespasser who 
is discovered to be in peril." 
In the case of Central Georgia Power Co. v. Walker, 
20 Ga. A. 645, 647, 93 SE 306, the court held that the 
plaintiff was a trespasser and at page 306 of the SE 
Reporter it states: 
"* * * The plain answer to this assumption is 
that, between the defendant and the plaintiff, con-
sidering the latter as a trespasser, there was no re-
lation which per se gave rise to any duty. The duty 
to a trespasser does not flow from the relation; none 
exists, except a wrongful relation. It can arise only 
with the peril to the trespasser. Until the peril arises, 
and until the defendant knows of the peril to the 
trespasser, there can be no duty to warn the tres-
passer * * *'' 
Volume I, Summary of California Law by Witkin, 
Sixth Edition, page 740, states: 
"Duty Toward Known Trespassers. The Torts 
Restatement (pars. 336, 337) declares that where 
the defendant knows or should know that a tres-
passer has come on the land, he has the duty to 
warn of artificial conditions constituting concealed 
dangers, and to exercise reasonable care in carrying 
on activities. This same result has been reached 
under the theory that failure to warn of a trap or 
pitfall, or to conduct activities with due care to-
ward a known trespasser, amounts to 'wilful or wan-
ton' conduct. * * * 
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* * * But where the defendant neither knows of the 
plaintiff's presence, nor has any reason to expect 
him to be there, the duty does not exist." 
In the case of Blaycock v. Coates, et al, 44 C app 2d 
850 113 P 2d 256, the plaintiff, a girl of 13 years, was 
walking with her two sisters and a boy along the high-
way about a mile from their home. Her dog ran loose 
and became mired in a sump about 250 feet long and 
100 feet wide. The surface of the sump was covered with 
sand or dirt, the underneath part was oil. As she went 
in and tried to extricate her dog from the sump, she be-
came stuck herself. The court stated at 113 P. 2nd, page 
257: 
· "Defendant argues that the sump was not an 
'attractive' nuisance. That since plaintiff was a 
trespasser, defendant was under no obligation to 
plaintiff to keep the premises in a safe condition 
although the trial court found that defendant knew 
that it (the sump) was attractive to children. The 
liability of defendant need not be predicated upon 
the attractive nuisance doctrine. The conclusion 
of the trial court may be sustained under the gen-
eral rule that a land owner may not construct or 
maintain a trap or pitfall into which he knows or 
has reason to believe that a trespasser will probably 
fall. The liability of the owner in such cases depends 
upon the circumstances surrounding the mainten-
ance of the 'trap', the extent of the danger involved 
and the comparative ease or difficulty of preventing 
the danger without disturbing or impairing the 
usefullness of the thing which is claimed to be a 
trap or pitfall. Upon the trial judge the duty is 
placed of determining the issue of liability in view 
of all the conditions shown by the evidence. In 
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support of plaintiff's contention that the trial court 
was justified in concluding that the defendant is 
liable plaintiff properly cites the case of Malloy v. Hi-
bernia Savings & Loan Society, 3 Cal Unrep 76, 21 
P. 525, a case in which the owner was held 
liable where a child fell into a cess pool on the de-
fendant's property about ten feet from the sidewalk. 
In referring to this case it was said in Loftus v. De-
hail, 133 Cal 214, 217, 65 P 379, 380: 'It is true 
that damages were there sought for the death of an 
infant, occasioned by falling into a cess pool; but the 
complaint would have been sufficient to have war-
ranted a recovery had an adult been killed under 
the same circumstances for the complaint showed 
a veritable trap,-a cesspool, open and unguarded, 
yet with its surface covered with a layer of de-
ceptive earth to a level with the adjacent land, into 
such a trap anyone, adult or child might have 
walked.'" 
In the case of Euclid-105th Streets Property Co. 
v. Beckman, 42 NE 2nd 789, the landlord, owner of the 
property, had covered a skylight of glass with roofing 
of tar paper and graveled over it so that it had the 
appearance of a roof. Th~ employees had frequently seen 
servants and tenants washing the windows standing 
upon the covered skylight. One of the tenants fell 
through the skylight as a result of the tar paper giving 
way. The court stated in 42 NE 2d, at page 791: 
"We have gone over this record and have taken 
up all the errors and we cannot agree with the 
learned counsel for the defendant that the court 
erred in not directing a verdict either at the close 
of plaintiff's testimony or at the close of all the 
testimony. If we understand the law upon this sub-
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ject it is that while the defendant is not liable for 
ordinary negligence to a trespasser or a licensee, 
perhaps owing a less duty to a trespasser than to a 
licensee, yet we think the law is very clear, confining 
our attention to that of the licensee only, because we 
think that is what this woman was in the instant 
case, while we admit that the owner of the premises 
would not be liable for ordinary negligence to a 
licnsee, yet where a situation is created and tolerated 
by the defendant, the owner of the premises, which 
amounts to a trap or hidden danger covered up, 
and the licensee is injured by reason of that danger 
or trap, as one might say, the defendant is re-
sponsible and liable for the damages that result 
therefrom." 
In the case of Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110, 
193 A 608, the court was particularly interested in 
the Restatement of Torts, par. 339 with respect to the 
duty of a land owner with reference to trespassing 
children when they know of their presence or should 
know of their presence. The court, however, made this 
statement at page 610, the Atlantic Reporter: 
" * * *The court accurately instructed the jury 
that the owner of the land is not bound to anticipate 
the presence of trespassers or keep a lookout for 
them or maintain his premises in a safe condition for 
them, but that when he knows, or under all the cir-
cumstances, should know, that a trespass is being 
committed, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care 
to prevent an injury to the intruder. 
"The court's reasoning and as put forth by the 
lower court was to the effect that the dangerous con-
dition; i.e., the stacking of the lumber upon the land 
ower's premises for the construction of a new house, 
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... 
constituted a dangerous condition which could be 
found to be a nuisance.'' 
The court stated at page 611: "* * * One of the 
plaintiff's claims was that the pile of lumber as it 
stood upon defendant's land constituted a nuisance, 
and the court correctly charged the jury that if the 
natural tendency of the act complained of was to 
create danger and inflict injury upon person or prop-
erty, it might properly be found a nuisance as a mat-
ter of fact." 
In the case of McPheters v. Loomis, 125 Conn. 526, 
7 A 2d 437 the facts are that a boy was found crushed 
beneath a telephone pole some ten days after the pole 
had been left at the side of the road. The company was 
chargeable with the proposition that people had tres-
passed along this route. The court stated at page 440: 
"* * * In other words this boy was a trespasser 
as to the Western Union and the Western Union 
ordinarily owed the boy no duty and the duty came 
into existence only if a nuisance existed, or if the 
Western Union was negligent in permitting a danger-
ous condition to remain upon its premises of which 
it had use, if children were actually trespassing, and 
if it knew of that fact, or ought to have known of it. 
"* * * However, under our law when the pres-
ence of the trespasser becomes known, the land 
owner owes a duty to use ordinary care to avoid in-
juring him * * * but, if the owner or his servants 
know that the presence of trespassers is to be ex-
pected, then the common obligation of exercising 
reasonable care gives rise to the correlative duty of 
taking such precautions against injuring trespassers 
as a reasonable fore-sight of harm ought to suggest." 
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The Pennsylvania court in the case of Frederick v. 
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. 337 Pa 13'6, 10 A 2d 576 
gives a good definition of a case of wilful or wanton 
negligence. In this case a passenger fell beneath the 
train. The conductor after being advised that someone 
was down there made a careful search but apparently 
did not find the body so he started the train. The plaint-
iff was horribly injured. The court stated at page 578 
Atl. Reporter: 
"The legal obligation to trespassers has been 
traditionally stated to be the avoidance of wilful 
or wanton negligence. Willful negligence is an ob-
vious misnomer. Wanton negligence, as distinguish-
ed from ordinary negligence, is characterized by a 
realization on the part of the tort feazor or at least 
ization on the part of the tort feazor-or at least 
what would cause such a realization to a reasonable 
man,-or the probability of injury to another, and by 
a reckless disregard, nevertheless of the consequen-
ces. As applied to the type of cases of which the 
present is an example, it is not wanton negligence 
to fail to use care to discover the presence of an un-
anticipated trespasser, but it is wanton negligence, 
within the meaning of the law, to fail to use ordi-
nary and reasonable care to avoid injury to a tres-
passer after his presence has been ascertained." 
Professor Bohlen, in an article in the Harvard Law 
Review, March 1937, entitled "Fifty Years of Torts" 
summarizes the evolution of the trespasser. He states at 
page 736: 
"Even before 1886 the wind had somewhat 
changed. The individual citizen's interest in his per-
sonal safety, in which the state also soon came to be 
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recognized as having an interest, began to be giv-
en a sufficient importance to deprive land owners 
of some of their original immunities. (9) Today the 
trespasser may recover under many circumstances 
under which fifty years ago recovery would have 
been denied him. While the old formula that a pos-
sessor of land is liable to a trespasser or even to a 
bare licensee only for wanton or wilful misconduct 
remains in customary use, its content has been so 
changed as to contradict the words which express it. 
''In many jurisdictions it is held that a land 
owner who knows that trespassers are in the habit 
of intruding upon a limited part of his premises 
may not without warning introduce into such part 
a dangerous animal or create a dangerous condition 
which is abnormal to the land and which, therefore, 
the trespassers have no reason to expect to find 
therein. The extreme danger to those who cross rail-
way tracks in ignorance of the approaching trains 
has lead courts to require warnings to be given at 
points on their rights of way where to the know-
ledge of the railway the public are accustomed to 
cross. The mere posting of notice forbidding tres-
pass is not enough to absolve the railway. Warning 
must be given. 
"Again, enough persists of the privilege of land 
owners to ignore the even probable intrusions of tres-
passers upon their land, to protect the land owners 
from liability for acts which are recognizably like-
ly to injure trespassers who may, without the 
knowledge to the owner, roam at large over the 
land. Nonetheless, there are many jurisdictions 
which, while persisting in the formula that toward 
the trespasser the land owner owes no duties save 
to refrain from inflicting wanton or wilful injuries, 
hold that upon the discovery of a trespasser, the 
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failure to use such care .as would be required in a 
neutral place is wanton or wilful misconduct." 
For other cases bearing out these same propositions 
Hobbs v. George W. Blanchard & Sons Co. 74 
NH 116, 65 A 382, Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal 345, 
47 P. 113, 598, 156 ALR p. 1237. "In some cases it 
appears · tnat the courts have assumed that the in-
juries sustained by the plaintiff as a licensee did 
not result from any 'active' or 'affirmative' negli-
gence on the part of the licensor. Also, Millspough 
v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. 1938, 1048 Ind. 
App. 540, 12 NE 2nd 396 (action for death of a de-
cedent who drowned while fishing on stream upon 
defendant's premises when his boat was drawn 
through a breach in an old dam); Gallagher v. Ford-
ham and L Co. 1939, NYS 2nd 322 (injuries sustain-
ed by 8 year old licensee in a fall into a hole at the 
bottom of a slope on defendant's vacant lot); Paf-
ford v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co. 1940, 217, NC 730, 
9 SE 2nd 408 (injuries from a fall into an open ele-
vator shaft in a building under construction); Gal-
veston, H & S AR Co. v. Matzdorf 1908, 102 Tex 
42, 112 SW 1036, 20 LRA (Ns) 833, 132 AM ST REP 
849, (injuries resulting from a fall over a piece of 
wire projecting from a door mat). 
It is apparent from a reading of the cases that the 
rule of the Restatement and as quoted in the majority 
opinion in the prior decision of this court is supported 
by the cases under the general propositions of nuisances, 
pitfalls, traps, etc. There certainly can be no basis to re-
spondent's argument that this court is adopting a new 
academic statement which has no practical application. 
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(2) Contributory Negligence. 
Respondent's argument that appellant is guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law can certainly 
have no application to the case at bar. Justice Wolfe 
in tb ~ majority opinion issued prior to the rehearing 
wen1 into this question quite thoroughly on the bases 
ur th2 case of Knox v. Snow- U -, 229 P 2d 874. In 
that case the court accepted the general rule regarding 
contributory negligence as stated in 38 Am Juris, Negli-
gence, page 861: 
'~It is said that wlien the defense of contributory 
negligence is urged as a ground for a non suit, it 
must appear that reasonable men acting as triers of 
fact would find without any reasonable probability 
of differing in their means, either that the plaint-
iff knew and appreciated the danger, or that ordin-
arily prudent men under similar circumstances 
would readily acquire such knowledge and appre-
ciation. As it generally is expressed, a plaintiff will 
not be held to have been guilty of contributory neg-
ligence if it appears that he had no knowledge or 
means of knowledge of the danger and conversely, 
he will be deemed to have been guilty if it is shown 
that he knew or reasonably should have known of 
the peril and might have avoided it by the exercise 
of ordinary care." 
There is nothing in this case with reference to the 
premises which would reasonably inform the appellant of 
any trap, pitfall or dangerous condition existing on the 
premises. The jury could certainly find that it was 
reasonable under these circumstances for the appellant 
to give his attention to the merchandise which he was 
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interested in purchasing and ignore the floor. The ques-
tion is one to be decided by the jury as to the many fac-
tors involved. 
Justice Hendricks in his dissenting opinion concludes 
that the hole in the floor was open, i.e., that the elevator 
was in the "up" position; that the light in the basement 
was on which would clearly make the hole discernible; 
that a man the size of appellant could not fall through 
a two-foot hole and, therefore, the appellant jumped 
into the hole with "both feet;" that defendant had been 
a salesman and man about town for 20 years and, there-
fore, well acquainted with the liquor laws pertaining to 
the sale of liquor; that Mrs. Cannon did not see appel-
lant go through the hole, that she was looking in another 
direction "waiting to usher him out sans a bottle of li-
quor;" that Mrs. Cannon had a right to assume appellant 
would move in only one direction and that would be 
away from the hole; that a lighting expert testified that 
a lighting "gadget" proved that the store lighting sys-
tem made the floor as "light as day." Based upon these 
assumptions and some others that he sets forth in his 
dissenting opinion, it is concluded that the appellant 
is negligent as a matter of law and hence there is no 
reason for these matters to be submitted to a jury for 
a determination. 
In the first place there is a dispute in the evidence 
as to whether or not the elevator was in the ''up" posi-
tion. See R. 78, 80. 81, 174. There is no evidence in the 
record to indicate whether there was a light on in the 
basement or not. The assumption that appellant could 
not fall through the two-foot hole in the floor is abso-
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lutely without basis in the record. There is nothing 
that would indicate that appellant jumped through the 
hole. The testimony of Mrs. Cannon, the respondent's 
own witness, is to the effect that she saw Mr. Martin 
fall through the hole. R. 74. Furthermore at page 87 
in the record it is explicitly set out that the respondent's 
own witness testified that the fall was an obstructed 
fall, causing a rubbing sound. R. 49, 77. The conclusion 
that appellant is a salesman and man about town and 
therefore acquainted with the liquor laws has no basis 
in the record. The statement that Mrs. Cannon did not 
see appellant go through the hole because she was look-
ing in another direction "waiting to usher him out sans a 
bottle of liquor" is erroneous. Mrs. Cannon testified that 
she saw Mr. Martin fall through the hole. R. 174. Fur-
thermore, how Justice Hendricks can conclude that Mrs. 
Cannon had a right to assume the appellant would move 
in only one direction is incomprehensible. A reading of 
the record by appellant does not indicate anything to 
the effect that the lighting expert testified that the store 
lighting system made the floors light as day. Mr. Felt's 
statements were that for particular conditions certain 
foot candles of light were required, such as for aisles, 
auditoriums, passageways, etc. Questions that have 
been raised by Justice Hendricks in his dissenting opin-
ion show clearly the necessity for a jury determination 
as to whether the appellant was guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, appellant respectfully contends that 
the majority decision heretofore rendered by this court 
should be reaffirmed and the matter remitted to the 
trial court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCullough, Boyce & McCullough 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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